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Abstract
We are concerned with the vulnerability of computer vi-
sion models to distributional shifts. We formulate a com-
binatorial optimization problem that allows evaluating the
regions in the image space where a given model is more
vulnerable, in terms of image transformations applied to
the input, and face it with standard search algorithms. We
further embed this idea in a training procedure, where we
define new data augmentation rules according to the image
transformations that the current model is most vulnerable
to, over iterations. An empirical evaluation on classifica-
tion and semantic segmentation problems suggests that the
devised algorithm allows to train models that are more ro-
bust against content-preserving image manipulations and,
in general, against distributional shifts1.
1. Introduction
When designing a machine learning system, we gener-
ally desire it may perform well on a wide realm of different
domains. However, the training data at disposal is typically
defined by samples from a limited number of distributions,
resulting in unsatisfactory performance when the model has
to process data from unseen distributions [26, 9, 7, 55]. This
problem is typically referred to as distributional shift or do-
main shift, and it was shown to affect models even in cases
where the distance between training and testing domain is—
apparently—very limited [46, 47].
This vulnerability also affects the robustness of machine
learning models against input manipulations [19, 24, 25],
potentially leading to harmful situations. As a concrete
example, consider the algorithms that analyze images up-
loaded to social networks in order to evaluate, e.g., if an
image contains violence or adult content. The huge set of
image modifications that users might carry out can make
the underlying learning systems fail in several ways if they,
*VM is also with Huawei Technologies (Ireland) Co., Ltd., Dublin.
1Code at github.com/ricvolpi/domain-shift-robustness
Figure 1. (Top) Image subdivided in 2 parts, in which the left part is orig-
inal, and the right part was subject to a content-preserving (appearance)
transformation. Image transformations can cause distributional shifts that
models are not able to handle (bottom-left). Models trained with the meth-
ods proposed in this paper are more robust against a variety of image trans-
formations (bottom-right)
accidentally or with malicious intent, cause a shift that the
models are not able to figure out. Recognizing this weak-
ness of modern learning systems, an important research di-
rection is defining methods to understand a priori which
distributional shifts will lead to a fail of the model.
In this paper, we start from this idea, and develop
methods to evaluate and improve the performance of ma-
chine learning models for vision tasks, when the input can
be modified through a series of content-preserving image
transformations. By “content-preserving” [19], we intend
transformations that do not modify an image content, but
only the way it is portrayed (e.g., modifying RGB intensi-
ties, enhancing contrast, applying filters, etc).
We cast this problem in terms of combinatorial optimiza-
tion. Given a black-box model, a bunch of samples, and
a set of image transformations, our goal is to individuate
the distributional shifts that the model is most vulnerable to
when image transformation tuples (namely, concatenations
of transformations) are applied. To find these tuples, we
investigate two different search algorithms—random search
and evolution-based search—showing that it is easy to find
tuples that severely deteriorate the model performance for
a variety of tasks, such as face detection, semantic scene
segmentation, and classification. The main application
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for this method as-is, is to evaluate the vulnerability of a
machine learning model before its deployment. Coupled
with proper transformation sets, this tool can indeed be
used to verify the robustness of a model under a broad
variety of input manipulations and visual conditions.
Furthermore, we introduce a training procedure to learn
more robust models against this class of transformations.
We design an algorithm where new data augmentation rules
are included over iterations, in order to cover the distribu-
tional shifts where the current model is more vulnerable.
We show that models trained in this way are more robust
against content-preserving input image manipulations and,
moreover, better generalize to unseen scenarios at test time.
1.1. Background and related work
Vulnerability of learning systems. Recently, the vulner-
ability of learning systems in different scenarios has gained
a lot of attention, in particular in relations with computer vi-
sion models (typically, deep convolutional neural networks,
or “ConvNets” [30]). A widely studied area is the one re-
lated to defense against adversarial perturbations. Gilmer
et al. [19] makes a distinction between adversarial samples
that are merely content-preserving or also indistinguishable
from the originals. The latter case takes into account im-
perceptible (to human eye) input perturbations that make a
model fail. This paradigm has been extensively studied in a
substantial body of works (e.g., [20, 51, 32, 22, 41, 38]).
Instead, we can include a broader range of transforma-
tions in the “content-preserving” class. Given some input,
the content-preserving transformations are the ones that do
not change its content, even if the appearance may change
significantly. For example, Gilmer et al. [19] explore the
performance of a classifier trained on MNIST [31] when
the input is modified by altering the background or adding
random lines. Brown et al. [11] show that we can cause
model failure by including adversarial patches in an image.
Hosseini et al. [24] realize that vision models are vulner-
able to negative images. The same research group, in an
other work [25], shows that we can find hue and saturation
shifts for a given image that a model is vulnerable to. Fur-
thermore, recent works [23, 18] show that state-of-the-art
ImageNet [15] models are vulnerable towards simple im-
age modifications. In particular, Hendrycks et al. [23] have
found that these models are not resistant towards basic noise
sources, and Geirhos et al. [18] have shown that these mod-
els are biased towards the texture of the objects.
As stated by Gilmer et al. [19], we also deem that “the
space of content-preserving image transformations remains
largely unexplored in the literature”. One of the aims of this
work is to help filling this gap, proposing methods to study,
generate, and be robust against content-preserving image
transformations. Differently from previous works [19, 25],
we are not interested in finding adversarial transformations
for single images. We are instead interested in discovering
the distributional shifts that a model is in general more vul-
nerable, applying the same transformation to all the images
in the provided set. In this sense, this work is related to
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [41], where a single, imperceptible
perturbation that fools ImageNet models is found.
Robustness against distributional shifts. There is a sig-
nificant body of works whose goal is overcoming issues re-
lated to distributional shift.
One of the main research direction is domain adapta-
tion [26, 9, 49, 17, 56, 52, 42, 57], where the goal is to
better generalize on domains of interest for which only
unlabeled data are available. While there are algorithms
that tackle this problem with remarkable results across a
variety of tasks, the assumption of an a priori fixed tar-
get distribution is often too strong. In domain generaliza-
tion [33, 43, 44, 50, 39, 58, 34, 36, 58] the problem of deal-
ing with unseen distributions is coped. Usually, the pro-
posed algorithms start from the assumption that the train-
ing dataset comprises a number of different populations.
One exception is the method proposed by Volpi et al. [58],
where the authors introduce a worst-case formulation that
improves generalization performance across distributions
close to the training one in the semantic space, using a
single-source distribution as starting point. Tobin et al. [54]
introduce domain randomization for models trained through
simulated data. It generates a randomized variety of visual
conditions during training, hoping to better generalize when
coping with real data.
In this context, the method devised by Volpi et al. [58]
is the most related approach to the proposed training strat-
egy (detailed in Section 4) since they are aimed at learn-
ing models that better generalize to unseen scenarios, with-
out any assumptions on the number of data populations in
the training set. As results will show, the competing algo-
rithm [58] results in models that are only slightly more re-
sistant than the Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) base-
line in the testbed presented in Section 3, and significantly
less performing than models trained through the Algorithm
proposed in this work in domain generalization settings.
2. Problem formulation
Let M be a model that takes in input images and pro-
vides an output according to the given task. Let D =
{(x(i), y(i))}NDi=0 ∼ P (X,Y ) be a set of datapoints with
their labeling, drawn from some data distribution. Finally,
let T = {(τ (j), l(k)j ), j = 0 . . . NT , k = 0 . . . Nj} be a set
where each object t = (τ (j), l(k)j ) is a data transformation τ
with a related magnitude l. The transformations give in out-
put datapoints in the same format as the input ones (RGB
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images throughout this work)2. The transformations can be
concatenated and repetitions are allowed; we define a com-
posite transformations as a transformation tuple. We define
the set of all the possible transformation tuples that one can
obtain by combining objects in T as
TN = {all N−tuples from T} (1)
A tuple T ∈ TN is the concatenation of N objects from
T, and we define it as T = (t1, . . . , tN ), with tn ∈ T.
When we apply the tuple T to a datapoint x, we apply all
the transformations from t1 to tN . Armed with this set, we
propose the following combinatorial optimization problem
min
T∗∈TN
f
(
M, T ∗, D
)
(2)
where f is a fitness function that measures the perfor-
mance of a modelMwhen provided with some labelled dat-
apoints D, transformed according to the tuple T ∗. Assum-
ing that the maximum and minimum values for the metric
associated with f are 1 and 0, respectively, we have
f : T −→ [0, 1] ⊂ R1
Intuitively, the N−tuples that induce lower f values, are
the ones that a model M is more vulnerable to, with respect
to the chosen metric. For classifiers, the optimization prob-
lem 2 assumes the form
min
T∗∈TN
f :=
1
ND
ND∑
i=0
1
{
y(i) = M
(
T ∗(x(i))
)}
(3)
In general, one can define an instance of problem 2 if
provided with a set of annotated samples D, a transforma-
tion set T (and, consequently, a tuple set TN ), a model M,
a measure to evaluate the performance of the model, and,
consequently, a fitness function f . It is not required to have
access to the model parameters: it can be a black-box. A
legit critique to this formulation is that we are not constrain-
ing the transformation tuples to be content-preserving. For
instance, in the classification problem 3, a proper formula-
tion would include a constraint similar to the following:
O(x(i)) = O(T (x(i))) ∀i,
which means that an oracle O(.) would classify the
transformed images in the same way as the original images.
In this work, we do not explicitly constraint the transforma-
tion tuples to be content-preserving through the optimiza-
tion problem. We satisfy the constraint by properly defin-
ing the set of available image transformations, e.g., focusing
on simple color transformations such as RGB enhancement,
contrast/brightness adjustments, and setting a proper value
for N in TN . Explicitly imposing the constraint is an im-
portant research direction, since it would allow to consider
more complex sets, and we reserve it for future work.
2To provide a practical example, one object from T might be the
“brightness” operation, and the intensity level might be +6%.
2.1. Transformation set and size of the search space
Given a transformation set T withNT available transfor-
mations τ (j), where the jth hasNj available magnitude val-
ues, the size of TN , and consequently the size of the search
space of the optimization problem 2, is S = (
∑NT
j=0Nj)
N .
In this work, we consider a transformation set T includ-
ing standard image transformations from the Python library
Pillow [4], as done by Cubuk et al. [14], and a few more
we included. It is defined by the following transforma-
tions, with the number of available intensity levels indicated
in parenthesis: autocontrast (20), sharpness (20), bright-
ness (20), color (20), contrast (20), grayscale conversion
(1), R-channel enhancer (30), G-channel enhancer (30), B-
channel enhancer (30), solarize (20). The description of the
various transformations is reported in Appendix A, as well
as the ranges of intensity levels. This set results in a search
space with size S = 211N . Throughout this work, we will
consider tuple sets TN with N = 3 and N = 5, resulting in
search spaces with size in the order of ∼ 106 and ∼ 1012,
respectively.
3. Searching worst-case image transformations
In this section, we analyze different solutions to face
the combinatorial optimization problem 2. Specifically,
the two approaches rely on random search and evolution-
based [40] search. We provide a proof of concept experi-
ment on MNIST models, and report a more exhaustive ex-
perimental evaluation in Section 5.
3.1. Random search.
Facing the optimization problem 2 through random
search is important for several reasons. First, it is the sim-
plest approach that we can adopt, thus it is worth to be ex-
plored. Further, random search is often a very strong base-
line to compare against, as shown, e.g., in hyper-parameter
optimization [8] and neural architecture search [35]. Fi-
nally, it sheds light on a relevent question: how is a model
affected by random image transformations?
The idea is to evaluate the fitness function f over an ar-
bitrary number of random transformation tuples, thus the
implementation is straightforward. For clarity and repro-
ducibility, we detail it step-by-step on Algorithm 1. In the
following, we will refer to this procedure as RS (short for
Random Search)
3.2. Evolution-based search.
We define a simple genetic algorithm [40], aimed at min-
imizing the objective in problem 2. Each individual of the
population is defined by a transformation N−tuple from a
set TN . We define standard Selection, Crossover and Muta-
tion operations. For a detailed explanation of genetic algo-
rithms and the definitions we provided, we refer to [40]. In
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Algorithm 1 RS (Random Search)
1: Input: N-tuple set TN , model M, dataset D =
{x(i), y(i)}NDi=1, fitness function f .
2: Output: transformation T ∈ TN
3: Initialize: fmin ← 1.
4: for k = 1, ...,K do
5: Sample T ∗ uniformly from TN
6: f∗ ← f(M, T ∗, D)
7: if f∗ < fmin then
8: T ← T ∗
the following, we briefly discuss how we use these concepts
in our framework.
• Selection. Given in input a population pop=
{T p}Pp=1, the fitness score of each individual fit=
{fp}Pp=1, and a positive integer Pˆ , returns in output a
population of Pˆ individuals sampled from pop with
individual probabilities proportional to 1fp .
• Crossover. Given in input two initialized popula-
tions pop1= {T p}Pp=1, where T p = (tp1, . . . , tpN ) and
pop2= {T˜ p}Pp=1, where T˜ p = (t˜p1, . . . , t˜pN ), for each
couple of elements {(T p, T˜ p)}Pp=1 we uniformly draw
an integer n ∈ [1, N ] and return the following two
individuals: T p,1 = (tp1, . . . , t
p
n, t˜
p
n+1, . . . , t˜
p
N ) and
T p,2 = (t˜p1, . . . , t˜
p
n, t
p
n+1, . . . , t
p
N ). The output is the
population defined by the 2P new individuals.
• Mutation. Given in input an initialized population
pop1= {T p}Pp=1 and a mutation rate η, it changes
each transformation of each tuple in pop with proba-
bility η, sampling from T.
Endowed of these methods, we implement an evolution-
based search procedure, detailed in Algorithm 2. The com-
plexity is O(PK), where P is the population size and K
is the number of evolutionary steps. Notice that the opera-
tions associated with lines 5 and 11, namely computing the
fitness function value for each transformation in the popu-
lation, constitute the computationally expensive part of the
algorithm. For each run, we perform P (K+1) fitness func-
tion evaluations. In the following, we will refer to this pro-
cedure as ES (short for Evolution-based Search).
3.3. Proof of concept: MNIST
The MNIST dataset [31] is defined by 28× 28 pixel im-
ages, representing white digits on a black background. It is
divided into a 50, 000 sample training set and a 10, 000 sam-
ple test set. In our experiments, we train a small ConvNet
(conv-pool-conv-pool-fc-fc-softmax) on the whole training
set, via backpropagation [48]. We resize the images to
32 × 32 pixels, in order to be comparable with other digit
datasets (in view of the domain generalization experiments
Algorithm 2 ES (Evolution-based Search)
1: Input: N-tuple set TN , model M, dataset D =
{x(i), y(i)}NDi=1, fitness function f , population size P , muta-
tion rate η.
2: Output: transformation T ∈ TN
3: Initialize: fmin ← 1.
4: Initialize: pop← {Tp}Pp=1 sampling from TN
5: Initialize: fit← {fp ← f(M, T p, D)}Pp=1
6: for k = 1, ...,K do
7: newpop1← Select(pop, fit, P
2
)
8: newpop2← Select(pop, fit, P
2
)
9: pop← Crossover(newpop1, newpop2)
10: pop←Mutation(pop,η)
11: fit← {fp ← f(M, T p, D)}Pp=1
12: for p = 1, ..., P do
13: if fit[p] < fmin then
14: T ← pop[p]
reported in Section 5). We apply the search algorithms (RS
and ES) on problem 2 using 1, 000 samples from the test
set. We set N = 3, namely, we use transformation tuples
defined by three transformations.
The blue curve in Figure 2 is the density plot associ-
ated with all the fitness function values obtained while run-
ning RS for K = 10, 000 iterations, using as model M
the trained ConvNet—that achieves 99.3% accuracy on the
clean test set. The accuracy values are reported on the x-
axis. Values lower than the one indicated by the black flag
have less than 0.1% probability to be achieved by trans-
forming the input through transformation tuples sampled
from TN . This plot provides a glance on the vulnerability
of MNIST models to the image transformations included in
our set. It shows that there is a substantial mass of transfor-
mation tuples that the model is resistant to, but, even though
with lower probability to be sampled, there are transforma-
tion tuples against which the model is severely vulnerable.
Table 1 (RS row) shows the minimum accuracy obtained
in 10, 000 evaluations of the fitness function f , averaged
over 6 different models. We report results associated with
both models trained via standard ERM (homonymous col-
umn) and models trained through the method proposed by
Volpi et al. [58] (“ADA” column). As one can observe,
both types of models are severely vulnerable to the trans-
formation tuples found through RS. For comparison with
previous work, we also report results obtained on negative
images [24] and on images with random hue/value pertur-
bations [25] (for the latter, we used the original code).
We proceed by approaching problem 2 through ES, set-
ting population size P = 10, number of generations K =
99 and mutation rate η = 0.1. With this setting, the number
of fitness evaluations is 1, 000. The red flags in Figure 2
indicate the fmin values achieved on 6 different runs, using
the same ConvNet as in the RS experiment. A comparison
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Performance of MNIST models
Training procedure
Test ERM ADA [58] RDA RSDA ESDA
Original .993± .001 .992± .001 .993± .001 .992± .001 .993± .001
RS .160± .024 .192± .025 .941± .011 .977± .001 .979± .003
ES .122± .028 .177± .042 .927± .007 .979± .005 .977± .000
Neg. [24] .436± .042 .448± .046 .991± .001 .992± .001 .992± .001
SAE [25] .979± .005 .980± .005 .985± .004 .974± .007 .971± .016
Table 1. Accuracy values associated with MNIST models in different
training/testing conditions, averaged over 6 different training runs. Each
row is associated with a different test: Original refers to performance
achieved on clean test samples; RS and ES refer to results obtained apply-
ing the transformations found via RS and ES, respectively; Neg and SAE
are related to adversarial attacks detailed in [24] and [25], respectively.
Each column is related to models trained with a different procedure.
Figure 2. Top. The blue curve represents the density plot related to
10, 000 transformation tuples uniformly sampled for RS. The black flag
represents the 0.1% probability threshold for RS. The red flags represent
the accuracy values obtained via ES. Three examples of sample sets result-
ing from different transformations are reported, with green and red squares
indicating whether the sample is mis-classified or not, respectively. Bot-
tom. Evolution of fmin value averaged over 6 runs of ES.
between the 0.1% threshold (black flag) and the results ob-
tained via evolution shows that ES allows to efficiently find
low-probability transformation tuples that the model is most
vulnerable to. Furthermore, even though we set K = 99,
EF can find transformation tuples that go beyond the 0.1%
threshold in less iterations. We report this evidence in Fig-
ure 2 (bottom), which shows the evolution of fmin during
200 iterations of ES. Comparing this result with the ones
pictured in Figure 2 (top), one can observe that even by set-
ting K ' 30 (310 fitness function evaluations), ES out-
performs the 0.1% threshold in the RS results. We report
numerical results in Table 1 (ES row), where we average
Algorithm 3 Robust Training
1: Input: D = {x(i), y(i)}NDi=1, initialized weights θ0, N−tuple
set TN , initialized data augmentation set Ttr , learning rate α.
2: Output: learned weights θ
3: Initialize: θ ← θ0
4: for h = 1, ..., H do
5: for j = 1, ..., J do
6: Sample (x, y) uniformly from D
7: Sample T uniformly from Ttr
8: θ ← θ − α∇θ`(θ; (T{x}, y))
9: Find T ∗ ∈ TN by running RS or ES on a subset of D
10: Append T ∗ to Ttr
11: while training is not done do
12: Sample (x, y) uniformly from dataset
13: Sample T uniformly from Ttr
14: θ ← θ − α∇θ`(θ; (T{x}, y))
over 6 models the lowest fmin achieved over 6 runs of ES
with different initializations. In Section 5, we will provide
a more exhaustive analysis of the efficacy of RS and ES to
approach different instances of problem 2.
4. Training more robust models
In this section, we detail two straightforward methods
devised to train models that are robust against content-
preserving transformations from a given set.
The simplest approach that one can devise is likely the
following: given a set TN , we can perform data augmen-
tation by sampling transformation tuples T ∈ TN and ap-
plying them to the training images throughout the training
procedure. We term this method Randomized Data Aug-
mentation, in short RDA. This technique can be interpreted
as an application of domain randomization [54] to real data
instead of simulated ones.
Drawing inspiration from the literature related to adver-
sarial robustness [20, 51, 58], where a loss is minimized
with respect to adversarially perturbed inputs, we devise a
method that is more effective than RDA in our setting. We
propose a training procedure where transformation tuples
that the current model is most vulnerable to are searched
throughout the training procedure (via RS or ES), and data
augmentation is performed according to the so-found trans-
formations. We implement this idea as follows: (a) we de-
fine a transformation set to sample from during training (the
“data augmentation set” Ttr), that at the beginning of train-
ing only comprises the identity transformation; (b) we train
the network via gradient descent updates [12], augment-
ing samples by applying transformations uniformly sam-
pled from Ttr (in this work, the loss ` used is the cross-
entropy function between the output of the model and the
ground truth labels); (c) we run RS or ES, using appropri-
ate fitness function f and tuple set TN , and append the so-
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found transformation tuple to Ttr. We alternate between
steps (b) and (c) for the desired number of times, and (d)
we repeat step (b) until the value of the loss ` is satisfactory.
The procedure is also detailed in Algorithm 3.
As results will show, the latter method performs signifi-
cantly better than RDA in several settings. In the next Sec-
tions, we will refer to this method as RSDA or ESDA, short
for Random Search Data Augmentation and Evolution-
based Search Data Augmentation, respectively
5. Experiments
In Section 3.3, we provided a first evidence that the prob-
lem formulation introduced in Section 2 can be useful to
detect harmful distributional shifts for a given model—in
terms of image transformations. In Section 4, we introduced
different methods to train more robust models.
In this section, we further validate the effectiveness of
RS and ES on different instances of problem 2, associated
with models for classification, semantic segmentation and
face detection. Furthermore, we evaluate the performance
of classification and semantic segmentation models trained
through RDA, RSDA and ESDA, assessing both their ro-
bustness against image transformations and their domain
generalization properties. When we search for transforma-
tions while running RSDA and ESDA (Algorithm 3, line 9),
we setK = 100 for RS andK = 10 for ES. When we apply
ES, we set number of individual P = 10 and mutation rate
η = 0.1 throughout the entire analysis. We use accuracy as
evaluation metric in all the experiments.
5.1. Digit Recognition
Experimental setup. We adopt the same experimental
setting detailed in Section 3.3. We train models via ERM
and RDA for 106 gradient descent updates. When we
train models through RSDA/ESDA, we set J = 104 and
H = 100, running a total of 106 weight updates also in this
case. We use a subset of 1, 000 samples from the training
set when we run RS/ES (Algorithm 3, line 9). In all the
experiments, we set the size of the transformation tuples as
N = 3. We use Adam [28] as optimizer, with learning rate
α = 3 · 10−4, β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999 and  = 10−8.
In addition to assessing model vulnerability against the
transformations found via RS and ES, we also evaluate
the domain generalization capabilities of MNIST models,
testing on different, unseen digit datasets (SVHN [45],
SYN [17], MNIST-M [17], USPS [16]), following the eval-
uation protocol used by Volpi et al. [58]. Samples from
every dataset were resized to 32 × 32 pixels and treated as
RGB images, to be comparable. Notice that we do not use
any sample from other dataset than MNIST during training.
Results. In Section 3.3 we showed that our setup allows
to find transformation tuples that lower the accuracy of
Domain generalization performance of MNIST models
Testing dataset
Training
Method SVHN SYN MNIST-M USPS
ERM .365± .021 .477± .015 .590± .012 .812± .013
ADA [58] .391± .017 .482± .019 .595± .013 .819± .016
RDA .395± .017 .603± .005 .751± .013 .832± .013
RSDA .474± .048 .620± .012 .815± .016 .831± .012
ESDA .489± .052 .622± .013 .816± .016 .840± .012
Table 2. Performance of MNIST models trained with different meth-
ods (rows) and evaluated on test samples from different digit datasets
(columns). Results computed by averaging over 6 different runs.
MNIST models to values as low as ∼ 12% (Table 1 – ES
row, ERM column). We are now interested in evaluating the
performance on MNIST models trained through the meth-
ods detailed in Section 4 (RDA, RSDA and ESDA). Ta-
ble 1 (last three columns) shows the performance of models
trained with the proposed methods. The most robust model
is the one trained through ESDA, for which the accuracy
related to each testing case is greater than 97%. All our
models are resistant to the negative operation applied to the
images [24], with accuracy values greater than 99%. An
important result is that there is not a statistically significant
accuracy loss on original samples (Table 1 – first row).
Having confirmed that we can train more robust mod-
els against the types of perturbations introduced in this
work, we are interested in evaluating the performance in
the domain generalization testbed; Table 2 reports our find-
ings. Also in this setting, we observe that models trained
via ESDA are the most robust against distributional shifts.
Models trained via RSDA are slightly less performing, but
significantly more robust than the ones trained via RDA in
different test cases. The more significant result is that, when
testing on SVHN, there is ∼ 10% gap when comparing
RDA and ESDA. Furthermore, despite the transformation
set T used is biased towards color transformations, we can
observe improved performance with respect to ERM also
when testing on USPS, whose samples differ from MNIST
ones only in their shape.
5.2. CIFAR-10 Classification
Experimental setup. We use the CIFAR-10 [29] dataset,
and train Wide Residual Network models (WRN [59]) on
the provided training set. We have chosen this class of
models because they are broadly used in the community
and they provide results competitive with the state of the
art on CIFAR-10. We train networks with 16−layers and
set the width to 4, choosing a trade-off between accuracy
and training/testing speed, among the recipes proposed in
the original work [59]. We use the original code provided
by the authors [5].
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When training ERM and RDA the models, we follow
the procedure proposed in [59], and run stochastic gradient
descent with momentum 0.9 for 200 epochs, starting with
a learning rate 0.1 and decaying it at epochs 60, 120 and
160. When training RSDA and ESDA models, we observed
that the learning procedure is eased if the new augmentation
rules are included while we are training the model with a
large learning rate. For this reason, we start the learning
rate decay after having searched for a satisfactory number
of transformations. In the results proposed in this section,
we search for 100 different ones, and each search procedure
is followed by 5 epochs of training.
We set the size of the tuples in TN as N = 5; with re-
spect to the transformation set T described in Section 2.1,
we do not include solarize and grayscale. When we search
for transformations, we use 2, 000 samples drawn from the
training set. When we test the models, we search for trans-
formations through RS and ES using the whole test set.
We run RS with K = 1, 000 iterations and three runs
of ES with K = 100 iterations; the results reported in
the next paragraph are associated with the optimal fmin
found. In addition to testing the model vulnerability against
such transformations, we also evaluate the domain gener-
alization capabilities of WRN models, assessing the perfor-
mance on CIFAR-10.1 [46] dataset and on STL [13] dataset.
We remove samples associated with the class “monkey”,
not present in the CIFAR-10 dataset, and resize images to
32× 32, to be comparable.
Results. Table 3 reports the achieved results. The “ERM”
column, which shows the results obtained by testing base-
line models in different conditions, confirms the results we
observed in the MNIST experiment, although with less dra-
matic effects. Indeed, we can find transformation tuples
that the model is significantly vulnerable to, by using RS
(∼ 72%) and ES (∼ 56%, with a larger standard deviation).
Concerning models trained with our methods, also in this
experiment RDA represents an effective strategy, but RSDA
and ESDA allow to train more robust models, with respect
to the transformations we are testing against.
Furthermore, the last row, reporting results obtained
when testing on STL dataset, confirms the domain gener-
alization capabilities of models trained with our method;
using Algorithm 3, we can observe ∼ 7% improvement in
accuracy, when compared against ERM. When testing on
CIFAR 10.1, the benefits are less marked, but still notice-
able in the RSDA case. Each accuracy value reported was
obtained by averaging over 3 different runs.
5.3. Semantic Scene Segmentation
Experimental setup. We train FC-DenseNet [27] models
on the CamVid [10] dataset. We use the 103−layer version
of the model, relying on an open-source implementation [6].
Performance of CIFAR-10 models
Training procedure
Test ERM RDA RSDA ESDA
Original .946± .000 .944± .002 .950± .002 .946± .000
RS .724± .026 .899± .004 .904± .016 .915± .000
ES .565± .149 .862± .012 .867± .050 .913± .004
10.1 [46] .872± .004 .873± .007 .886± .009 .878± .003
STL [13] .466± .009 .503± .009 .526± .007 .534± .009
Table 3. Performance of CIFAR-10 models trained with different methods
(columns) and tested in different conditions (rows). The 10.1 row reports
results obtained by testing on CIFAR-10.1 [46]; the STL row reports the
ones related to STL [13]. Results computed by averaging over 3 runs.
Also in this case, the choice of the model is due to its suc-
cess with respect to the analyzed benchmark. The CamVid
dataset contains 367 training images, 101 validation images
and 233 testing images from 32 classes. We lower the sam-
ple resolution from 960 × 720 to 480 × 360, and train the
models for 300 epochs.
When we train using RSDA/ESDA, we run RS and ES
on 30 samples from the training set, and search for new
transformations every 10 epochs. We set the size of the
N−tuples as N = 5. With respect to the transformation set
T introduced in Section 2.1, we do not include solarize and
grayscale. When we test the vulnerability of the models,
we run RS (with K = 500) and three different runs of ES
(with K = 50) on 30 samples from the test set. As for pre-
vious experiments, we report results related to the minimum
fmin values found. Notice that the output of semantic seg-
mentation models is richer than the output of classification
models, since a prediction is associated with each pixel; in-
deed, 30 samples lead to 30 ·480 ·360 pixel predictions. We
use pixel accuracy as a metric [37]. We use RMSprop [53]
as optimizer, with decay 0.001.
Results. Table 4 reports the results we obtained. They
confirm the higher level of robustness of models trained via
RDA, RSDA and ESDA. In this experiment though, we can
observe a narrower gap between RDA and RSDA/ESDA.
Figure 3 shows the output of a model trained via ESDA
(middle) and the output of a model trained via standard
ERM (bottom), when the original input (first column, top) is
perturbed with different image transformations (top). These
results not only qualitatively show the better performance of
ESDA, but also that the transformation tuples we are sam-
pling from TN are realistic approximations of possible vi-
sual conditions that a vision module (for instance, for a self-
driving car) might encounter. For example, images in the
middle row, second and third column, can be considered as
simulations of the light conditions that one could encounter
during dawn or sunset—and in which the baseline model
performs poorly.
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Performance of CamVid models
Training procedure
Test ERM RDA RSDA ESDA
Original .862± .007 .851± 004 .854± 003 .851± .002
RS .458± .027 .812± .007 .825± .009 .820± .007
ES .311± .013 .811± .011 .824± .008 .822± .008
Table 4. Performance of CamVid models trained with different methods
(columns) and tested in different conditions (rows). Results computed by
averaging over 3 different runs.
Figure 3. A sample from CamVid (first column, first row) modified with
various image transformations. Second and last rows report the outputs of
models trained via standard ERM and via Algorithm 3, respectively.
5.4. Face detection
Experimental setup. We test our search methods on a
widely used API for face detection [1], that takes RGB im-
ages as input and provides in output the locations of the
faces in the image. We use four subsets of 1, 000 images
uniformly sampled from the MS-Celeb-1M [21], resized to
64 × 64, as datapoints in input to RS and ES. Each image
contains one celebrity face, thus the API gives in output a
single location if it detects a face, or nothing otherwise. In
practical terms, due to the nature of the input, we can inter-
pret the API as a binary model and test it through the opti-
mization problem 3. We set the number of transformations
as N = 3 and N = 5. For each N value and each subset
of faces, we run RS with K = 15, 000 iterations, and run 6
different runs of ES withK = 100. We average results over
the optimal fmin values obtained in the four subsets. With
respect to the transformation set T depicted in Section 2.1,
we do not include solarize.
Results. Table 5 reports the accuracy values obtained,
and Figure 4 reports different examples of faces modified
through the transformation tuples found via RS and ES.
Green and red squares indicate whether the API has de-
tected or not a face, respectively. Qualitatively, we observed
that the model tends to fail when the input manipulation is
such that some facial features are no longer visible or dete-
riorated (for example, the nose). The importance of these
vulnerabilities depends on the different API use cases. For
example, vulnerability to some grayscale tones might not
Performance of Face Detection API [1]
Original
Accuracy
RS
N=3
ES
N=3
RS
N=5
ES
N=5
.878± .007 .789± .010 .705± .069 .516± .014 .174± .134
Table 5. Accuracy of the Face Detection API in different testing condi-
tions, analogously to the previous tests reported in this work.
Figure 4. Four different examples of transformations found via RS and
ES. Green and red squares indicate whether the API has detected the face
or not, respectively.
matter for a model that deals with images recorded in the
streets, but it might matter for a social network application.
Vulnerability to extreme brightness conditions can be harm-
ful for a street camera, where the broad variety of possible
visual conditions might not allow to have a proper view of
the facial features. One strength of the search methods we
proposed is that they allow users to set transformation sets
according to the applications they are concerned about.
6. Conclusions
We propose a combinatorial optimization problem to
find distributional shifts that a given model is vulnerable
to, in terms of N−tuples of image transformations. We
show that random search and, in particular, evolution-based
search are effective approaches to face this problem. Fur-
ther, we show that the same search algorithms can be ex-
ploited in a training procedure, where harmful distributional
shifts are searched and harnessed. We report results for a
variety of tasks (classification, segmentation and face de-
tection), showing that the problem formulation is flexible
and can be adopted in different circumstances.
Among others, some valuable directions for future works
consist in (i) the implementation of more effective meth-
ods to approach the optimization problem 2, in order to find
more harmful transformations with reduced computational
cost, (ii) the analysis of more complex transformation sets,
and (iii) the definition of a proper content-preserving con-
straint in the optimization problem.
Acknowledgments. We are grateful to Jacopo Cavazza
and Federico Marmoreo for helpful discussions concerning
the problem formulation proposed in this work.
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A. Transformation Sets
Transformation Sets T for the Experiments
Experiment
Transformations Range No. Levels MNIST [31] CIFAR-10 [29] CamVid [10] Faces [1]
Autocontrast [0.0, 0.3] 20 X X X X
Brightness
[0.6, 1.4] 20 X
[0.8, 1.2] 20 X X X
Color [0.6, 1.4] 20 X X X X
Contrast [0.6, 1.4] 20 X X X X
Sharpness [0.6, 1.4] 20 X X X X
Solarize [0.0, 20.0] 20 X
Grayscale − 1 X X
R-channel enhancer
[−120, 120] 30 X X X
[−30, 30] 30 X
G-channel enhancer
[−120, 120] 30 X X X
[−30, 30] 30 X
B-channel enhancer
[−120, 120] 30 X X X
[−30, 30] 30 X
Size of TN 211N 190N 190N 191N
Table 6. List of transformations used.
In this Section, we report the image transformations briefly introduced in Section 2.1, and used throughout Sections 3.3
and 5. Table 6 reports them (column 1), with the range of magnitude values (column 2) and the number of values in which
the ranges have been discretized (column 3). Columns 4−7 indicate whether a transformation is used (X) in the experiments
of Sections 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, respectively. Grayscale conversion (“Grayscale” row) has only one magnitude value. For
all the transformations, excluding the R/G/B-channel enhancement operations, the reader can refer to the PIL library [4], and
in particular to the modules [3, 2]. We summarize them in the following, reporting the core descriptions.
• Autocontrast: “Maximize (normalize) image contrast. This function calculates a histogram of the input image, removes
cutoff percent of the lightest and darkest pixels from the histogram, and remaps the image so that the darkest pixel
becomes black (0), and the lightest becomes white (255)” [3].
• Brightness: “Adjust image brightness. [...] An enhancement factor of 0.0 gives a black image. A factor of 1.0 gives the
original image” [2].
• Color: “Adjust image color balance. [...] An enhancement factor of 0.0 gives a black and white image. A factor of 1.0
gives the original image” [2].
• Contrast: “Adjust image contrast. [...] An enhancement factor of 0.0 gives a solid grey image. A factor of 1.0 gives the
original image” [2].
• Sharpness: “ Adjust image sharpness. [...] An enhancement factor of 0.0 gives a blurred image, a factor of 1.0 gives
the original image, and a factor of 2.0 gives a sharpened image” [2].
• Solarize: “Invert all pixel values above a threshold” [3].
• Grayscale: “Convert the image to grayscale” [3]. We treat the output as an RGB image by replicating it in three different
channels.
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• R-channel enhancer: add a value to the R-channel of all pixels.
• G-channel enhancer: add a value to the G-channel of all pixels
• B-channel enhancer: add a value to the B-channel of all pixels
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